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Not just the ivory trade: corruption undermines every aspect of 1 
elephant conservation but can be reduced 2 
 3 
Introduction 4 
African elephants are in decline through illegal killing for ivory, with estimated reductions in 75% of 5 
306 studied populations (Wittemyer et al. 2014). The legal trade of ivory from natural mortality and 6 
problem animal control has been suggested as a way to reduce this problem, as it can provide a 7 
direct and regular source of funding to elephant conservationists in Africa (Stiles 2004), people who 8 
currently depend on over-stretched government budgets and grants from international donors to 9 
support their work. Such international trade has not taken place since 2008 but several African 10 
countries stockpile their ivory in expectation of future sales and many countries outside Africa have 11 
legal domestic markets for ivory certified as antique or coming from these legal stockpiles. A recent 12 
article by Bennett (2014) argues that such trade is counter-productive and should be banned 13 
because: (i) current legal domestic markets have been subverted by corruption and are allowing the 14 
laundering of illegal ivory, and; (ii) reducing this corruption to acceptable levels within the next few 15 
decades is impossible. The impact of corruption on conservation outcomes is often ignored in the 16 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƐŽǁĞǁĞůĐŽŵĞĞŶŶĞƚƚ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĨŽƌŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŐůŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞŝǀŽƌǇ17 
trade gives the impression that it is uniquely affected. Here we argue that corruption potentially 18 
undermines every aspect of elephant conservation and there is no evidence that any approach is 19 
more or less susceptible. Thus, the long-term future of elephants requires conservationists to learn 20 
lessons from other sectors to understand and tackle this problem. 21 
 22 
What is corruption? 23 
There is an extensive literature on the definition of corruption in which common themes are the 24 
abuse of office and implication that at least two willing parties are involved (World Bank 1997). 25 
Corruption can take many forms and may be more easily understood when broken down into 26 
component parts, such as bribery, cronyism, embezzlement, fraud and nepotism (Vargas-Hernández 27 
2013). While corruption can occur in any institution or society, it tends to thrive when there is weak 28 
rule of law, abnormal concentrations of power in one individual or institution, and no counter-29 
balancing mechanisms in place (Luo 2005). This is exacerbated when there is opportunity for 30 
financial gain, and risks are heightened when working in certain geographical areas.  In addition, 31 
there are circumstances in which organizations are particularly vulnerable to corrupt exploitation, 32 
such as when they rely on discretionary powers for permits, licenses or activities. Given this 33 
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background, it is reasonable to assume that many conservation organizations and initiatives are 34 
highly vulnerable to the effects of corruption, especially when dealing with valuable commodities. 35 
Despite this, we lack any systematic studies on key issues relating to corruption in conservation 36 
(Smith & Walpole 2005) and the only available evidence comes from case-studies, media reports and 37 
examples from other sectors. 38 
 39 
How does corruption impact elephant conservation? 40 
An increasing amount of evidence on the impacts of corruption in conservation comes from 41 
elephant projects, as the recent increase in poaching has made this a high profile issue, with park 42 
staff, enforcement officers and politicians all being implicated (Milman 2013). Furthermore, this 43 
supports studies from the academic literature showing correlations between elephant population 44 
trends and corruption (Smith et al. 2003; Burn et al. 2011) and documenting the role of corruption in 45 
the illegal killing of elephants for ivory (Gross 2007) and meat (Stiles 2012). Bennett (2014) adds 46 
compelling evidence for corruption undermining the legal sales of ivory but others argue the 47 
alternative conservation strategy she advocates, namely banning the legal trade, is similarly 48 
vulnerable. This is because both legal trade and trade bans are undermined by the collusion of 49 
corrupt officials in the illegal killing of elephants and the smuggling of ivory from producer to 50 
consumer states (Stiles 2014). 51 
 52 
Indeed, elephant conservation involves a range of approaches and corruption could impact them all 53 
(Table 1). Bribery undermines efforts to combat illegal trade, but also impacts on enforcement of 54 
anti-poaching laws (Barnes et al. 1995), sustainable hunting and effective land-use planning. 55 
Cronyism and nepotism reduce staff capacity and the likelihood of crimes being reported. 56 
Embezzlement reduces conservation funding levels (Thouless & Sakwa 1995), undermines positive 57 
incentives for community-based conservation through trophy-hunting and ecotourism (Leader-58 
Williams et al. 2009), and leads to decision makers focusing on the wishes of donors and elites more 59 
than stakeholders (Norton-Griffiths 2007). Fraud also diverts and reduces conservation funding and 60 
undermines donor confidence by claiming funds for non-existent projects or colluding to avoid 61 
paying concession fees (Laurance 2004). 62 
 63 
How can we reduce corruption? 64 
This suggests the influence of corruption on elephant conservation is far reaching and should be 65 
recognized as an important problem. Such a conclusion might appear depressing but fortunately 66 
there is plenty of evidence from other sectors that corruption can be reduced at the country (Alam & 67 
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Southworth 2012), institutional (United Nations 2009) and local project level (Landell-Mills 2013). A 68 
first step is to divide up the problem into specific issues based on type of corruption and type of 69 
conservation approach, e.g. embezzlement of protected area budgets. This makes the task less 70 
daunting, moving away from portraying corruption as a monolithic, unsolvable problem. Many of 71 
these issues can then be tackled by standard good management such as auditing accounts, adopting 72 
transparent hiring practices and prosecuting alleged miscreants (Transparency International 2013).  73 
More broadly, organizations benefit from developing anti-corruption policies and culture that help 74 
guide staff when dealing with the problem (Transparency International 2012). Issue-specific 75 
solutions are also needed so, for example, lessons for the ivory trade could be learnt from the Forest 76 
Stewardship Council (FSC) certification system. There are key similarities between the trade in ivory 77 
and tropical hardwood, as both come from slow-growing species, are highly valued commodities and 78 
their trade involves crossing national boundaries, obtaining permits and working with officials in 79 
countries with high levels of corruption (Cashore et al. 2007). Despite this, the integrity of the FSC 80 
certification process is widely recognized and is supported by most international conservation non-81 
governmental organizations (NGOs), although uptake in Africa is currently low (FSC, 2014). 82 
 83 
This shows that corruption can be reduced but shifts focus to the institutional and political will 84 
needed for this change. Therefore, one approach would be to focus on aspects of elephant 85 
conservation where conservation practitioners have most influence, and these tend to be those that 86 
act at the local to landscape level (Table 1). Increasing effectiveness at this scale would help ensure 87 
healthy elephant populations and local support for their conservation, as well as tackling the 88 
problem of ivory laundering at source. Moreover, this would have broader biodiversity benefits, 89 
given that recent declines in African elephants are not unique and are similar to those of lower 90 
profile African mammal species that are not impacted by international trade (Craigie et al. 2010). 91 
 92 
Just as importantly, we need action and leadership at higher political levels. Anti-corruption policies 93 
have been developed and enforced in other sectors through popular campaigns at the grassroots 94 
level and pressure from donors. One obvious approach would be for international conservation 95 
groups to lead on tackling the problem or to engage more closely with the anti-corruption 96 
community. They could follow the example of CAFOD, Tearfund and Christian Aid, development 97 
NGOs that recognized that corporate bribery was a major barrier to reducing international poverty 98 
and so played an active role in supporting anti-corruption legislation, such as the recent UK Bribery 99 
Act. A more radical approach would be to consider corruption when developing international policy. 100 
For example, the international community generally makes policy recommendations based on 101 
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protecting elephants in countries where they are declining most rapidly. We would argue these 102 
declines are likely to continue unless corruption is tackled and so elephant range states with 103 
effective anti-corruption policies should have more of a voice in international debates. 104 
 105 
Conclusions 106 
We are more sanguine about the future of African elephants than Bennett (2014), but without 107 
ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶǁĞĨĞĂƌƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐǁŝůůƌĞƐĞŵďůĞƚŚŽƐĞŽĨĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƌŚŝŶŽƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ108 
relatively large populations in countries with lower levels of corruption (Smith et al. 2013) and 109 
smaller populations in a few high-profile protected areas in countries where corruption is more 110 
prevalent. Despite this, corruption is still down-played in the conservation literature and so we 111 
applaud Bennett for raising the profile of this topic and detailing the countries involved. But this 112 
needs to be a beginning. We need much more research to understand the specifics of the problem 113 
and to start adopting tried-and-tested techniques for reducing corruption at every level. Such action 114 
could be inspired by the anti-corruption community, who are confident that corruption can be 115 
tackled given recent developments that include new legislation, new political commitment and 116 
greater enforcement (CMS, 2013). Indeed, it would be ironic if conservationists were to conclude 117 
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Table 1: An overview of elephant conservation strategies, their spatial scale and the relative role 178 
of conservation practitioners in their implementation. Conservation practitioners are defined as 179 
people responsible for implementing conservation policy or practice and can include government 180 
staff, members of civil society and the private sector.  Details will differ by country, region and 181 
project type, e.g. government plays a major role when land-use planning decisions involve state 182 
protected areas but the private sector can be more involved when planning in logging, agricultural 183 
and tourism concessions.  However, we argue there is a general trend for the relative role of these 184 
practitioners to decrease as spatial extent increases, so site-based interventions are often those 185 
where conservation practitioners can have the most impact. 186 
Elephant conservation strategy Spatial scale Relative role of 
conservation 
practitioner 
Protected area and habitat management Site Major 
Positive incentives through revenue generation from ecotourism Site Major 
Positive incentives through revenue generation from trophy hunting Site Major 
Increasing tolerance through human-elephant conflict mitigation Site Medium to Major 
Elephant population monitoring Site to sub-national Major 
Enforcement of anti-poaching legislation (largely by government 
staff) 
Site to sub-national Minor to Major 
Land-use planning to maintain and restore habitat and connectivity Landscape Minor to Medium 
Implementation of government policy on elephants and 
conservation 
National Minor to Major 
Enforcement of trade legislation on elephant products (mainly by 
government agencies) 
National to global Minor 
 187 
